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Turing,
Alan. On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the
Entscheidungsproblem, In Proceedings of The London Mathematical Society,
Series 2, vol 42, Part 3 and 4, pp. 230- 265. WITH: On Computable
Numbers… A Correction, In, vol 43, Part 7, pp. 544- 546. London: C.F.
Hodgson & Son, Ltd., Nov. 30, Dec. 23, 1936 and Dec. 30, 1937.
Octavo, original publisher’s printed wrappers. Three issues, each in
original wrappers; in custom cloth box.
First
edition, first printing, of the “blueprint for what would eventually
become the electronic digital computer” (Paul Gray).
A magnificent copy in original wrappers. Minute,
almost invisible glue reinforcement to very small area on two joints;
wrappers otherwise spotless and perfect. A truly outstanding copy in
original wrappers. Exceedingly scarce.
“Alan
Turing, while a mathematics student at University of Cambridge, was
inspired by German mathematician David Hilbert's formalist program,
which sought to demonstrate that any mathematical problem
can potentially be solved by an algorithm, that is, by a purely
mechanical process. Turing interpreted this to mean a computing machine
and set out to design one capable of resolving all mathematical
problems, but in the process he proved in his seminal paper “On
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem
[‘Halting Problem']” (1936) that no such universal mathematical
solver could ever exist.
In order to
design his machine (known to posterity as the “Turing machine”),
he needed an unambiguous definition of the essence of a computer. In
doing so, Turing worked out in great detail the basic concepts of a
universal computing machine, that is, a computing machine that could, at
least in theory, do anything that a special-purpose computing device
could do. In particular, it would not be limited to doing arithmetic.
The internal states of the machine could represent numbers, but they
could equally well represent logic values or letters. In fact, Turing
believed that everything could be represented symbolically, even
abstract mental states, and he was one of the first advocates of the artificial-intelligence
position that computers can potentially “think.” |